Statelessness and Roma Communities in the Czech Republic: Competing Theories of State Compliance by Linde, Robyn
Rhode Island College 
Digital Commons @ RIC 
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
2006 
Statelessness and Roma Communities in the Czech Republic: 
Competing Theories of State Compliance 
Robyn Linde 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ric.edu/facultypublications 
 Part of the International Law Commons, and the Other Political Science Commons 
Statelessness and Roma Communities in the Czech Republic:
Competing Theories of State Compliance
ROBYN LINDE*
1. Introduction
The system of national sovereignty, underpinning international relations in the mod-
ern world, is one wherein individuals exercise their rights and obligations primarily
through citizenship in a state. Holding citizenship in a state willing to extend rights
and protections is therefore the definitive factor in the exercise of rights, especially
human rights. When an individual does not possess membership in any state, that
individual is considered stateless. Statelessness is a problem that affects millions of
people, and although the exact number of stateless people is unknown, Refugees
International estimates it to exceed eleven million.1 While stateless people are found
throughout the world, the largest numbers reside in the former Soviet Union, East
and South Asia, especially Thailand, Nepal, Burma and Sri Lanka, as well as in
Europe, the Great Lakes region of Africa, and the Middle East.2
Statelessness has multiple causes; among the most common are intentional exclu-
sions that limit an individual’s citizenship to that of his or her parents, to place of birth,
or to a conflict between these alternative means of citizenship conferral. States may
also revoke or refuse to grant citizenship when a marriage takes place between citizens
of different states or when a state discriminates against individuals on the basis of gen-
der, religion, political opinion or ethnicity.3 Statelessness can also occur because of
administrative processes that are unnecessarily complex or because of fees that dis-
courage individuals from applying for citizenship. Finally, statelessness can occur
because of a transfer of territory following the dissolution, independence or succession
of a state when long-term residents cannot obtain citizenship in the new state.4
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1 M. Lynch, ‘Lives on Hold: The Human Cost of Statelessness’ (Refugees International, Washington
D.C., 2005), p. 1.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 3, E. Simperingham, ‘The International Protection of Stateless Individuals: A Call for
Change’ (University of Auckland, 2003).
4 Lynch, supra note 1, p. 5. Simperingham, supra note 3.
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States can protect individuals by becoming party to the treaties and declarations
found in international law and by respecting their treaty obligations. Foremost
among these agreements are the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Under these and
other treaties, states have specific obligations to refrain from creating stateless per-
sons. States can also confer citizenship on non-nationals, thus enabling them to par-
ticipate in the employment sector and national and local politics as well as have
access to educational opportunities, the judiciary and healthcare systems.5
This paper examines the Czech Republic’s passage in 1993 of a citizenship law that
rendered approximately 10,000 to 25,000 members of the Roma community state-
less.6 The Czech Republic, a former satellite state of the Soviet Union, peacefully
split from the Slovak Republic with the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federal
Republic (hereafter Czechoslovakia) in 1993, a process known as the Velvet Divorce.
Following the dissolution, a new citizenship law came into effect that put steep
requirements on individuals who wished to gain or retain Czech citizenship. These
requirements included verification of a five-year period of residence, a clean criminal
record, and unwieldy fees and administrative procedures. Many argued that these
requirements unfairly affected Roma, who were considered Slovakian by many non-
Roma Czechs. Many Roma did not have documentation to prove citizenship or resi-
dence, had criminal records that prevented successful applications, or could not
understand or afford the administrative procedures and costs required by the new law.
Following a string of previous revisions, an amendment to the law in 1999 rein-
stated the citizenship of the majority of these individuals. This paper examines the
full spectrum of factors that led to the 1999 amendment with a special focus on the
role of local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), human rights activists, inter-
national pressure, economic policy, and the unique qualities of the post-Soviet world
environment. Additionally, two major ideological trends in the Czech Republic will
be presented: the 1992–1997 Civic Democratic Party (ODS) era of euroskeptism and
the European Society school represented by former President Vaclav Havel and the
rise of the Social Democrats (CSSD) in 1998. The Czech case is especially instruc-
tive because the citizenship law was written, enacted and revised within a period of
six years. Although a number of changes took place during this time period, this
paper suggests that not least of these was the accession process to join the European
Union (EU) and a general trend in the Czech Republic toward participation in other
international and regional institutions, including the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), and the Council of Europe.
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1.1. Approaches to State Compliance
The objective of this paper is not to demonstrate the existence of compliance but to
explain it. Although the 1999 amendment removed the discriminatory clauses from
the 1993 citizenship law and effectively reinstated citizenship for most Roma, it is
not immediately evident why the change occurred. This paper will analyse and apply
two competing explanations for compliance, interest- and knowledge-based, for why
the Czech Republic changed its behaviour and altered its policy. Interest-based
approaches suggest that states comply with international norms when it is in their
interest to do so, especially when economic gains from compliance are predicted.
These theories posit that changes in state behaviour are the result of rational decision
making predicated upon the individual utility of self-interested actors, the product of
a cost-benefit analysis whereby states are focused on their own gains or losses.7
Within this calculus, state interests, understood as constant and unchanging, are
determined exogenously to interaction with other states. Domestic politics as an
explanatory variable is “negligible” in interest-based approaches and its influence
delimited.8 As such, the minimal, if not absent, role of domestic politics in interest-
based arguments results in the expectation that state interests would be consistent
across the tenure of successive domestic actors.
Whereas an economically grounded self-interest wields explanatory power in
interest-based theories, ideas and identity collectively comprise interest in knowl-
edge-based theories. These approaches suggest that states may alter their policies
through interaction with other states in the international system. Interaction with
other states, ideas and institutions may affect a given state’s identity regarding its role
in the international sphere, which may in turn affect that state’s perception of its
interests, thus leading to policy change. In other words, knowledge-based theories
are sociological and depart from interest-based theories in assuming a different path
to compliance, one wherein identity and interest co-constitute each other. Interests,
therefore, are developed within and through interaction with other states (endog-
enously) rather than preceding interaction with other states (exogenously). As an
endogenous theory of interest-formation, these models can account for changes in
interests. Moreover, endogeneity often requires theorists to examine domestic poli-
tics in order to understand the interplay of identity, interests and ideas.
Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink provide a sociological model of human rights
change that suggests that although states may originally alter their behaviour for
instrumental reasons, they may internalize the very ideas they once rejected through
socialization with other actors in the international system. This may occur in a series
of phases that mark a state’s path from violating human rights to compliance with
human rights norms and even the institutionalization of those norms. This model rec-
ognizes the importance of economic interests but suggests that these interests may
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7 A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, 55, Cambridge
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not always be sufficient to explain compliance. A sociological component needs to
be added in order to understand fully the motivations behind compliance.
Interest-based explanations for compliance would find evidence to support their
models in the greater potential economic gain of membership in European institu-
tions over the economic loss of extending rights to thousands of indigent persons.
Since interests are developed exogenously in these models, changes in leadership
within a given country would not affect that country’s interests. Interest-based mod-
els would be less useful if evidence suggested that compliance could not be
explained without reference to ideas, values, or identity or if interests were to shift
as a result of changes in domestic-level leadership. Knowledge-based approaches
would expect the identity of a state to affect its likelihood of compliance, which can
best be explained by these approaches if the role of ideas, shared values and identi-
ties were necessary to explain the Czech policy change. If the change in compliance
by the Czech government could be explained by reference to economic interests
alone, this would seriously undermine the explanatory power of knowledge-based
approaches. This paper will proceed with a brief summary of international law
regarding stateless persons in order to establish the norms with which the Czech
Republic complied. Following this, a detailed case study will be presented regarding
the citizenship law and its subsequent amendments. Finally, the case study will be
analysed in the context of the observable implications of both interest- and knowledge-
based approaches in order to gauge the usefulness of these approaches to explaining
state compliance.
2. Statelessness and International Human Rights Law
The desire to ensure that all individuals possess a nationality was first expressed in
the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws.9 Under the auspices of the Assembly of the League of Nations,
Article 1 of this Convention stated that it is the prerogative of each state to determine
its body of nationals.10 The Convention further stated, however, that this should only
be respected by other states “in so far as it is consistent with international conven-
tions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard
to nationality”.11 The Hague Convention, as well as an Advisory Opinion by the 1923
Permanent Court of International Justice on the Tunis and Morocco Nationality
Decrees, stressed that while it recognized state jurisdiction in determining citizenship
criteria, state action was limited by the requirement that it remain within the bounds
of customary law concerning nationality.12 As such, citizenship conferment or denial
is a fluid concept that changes relative to international precedent.
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9 League of Nations, ‘1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws’ (179 League of Nations Treaty Series, 1930).
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., Permanent Court of International Justice, ‘Advisory Opinion on the Tunis and Morocco
Nationality Decrees’ (1923).
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Article 15§1–2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)
affirms, “[e]veryone has the right to a nationality” and “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his nationality or denied the right to change his nationality”. Nationality
is understood to be a vehicle for devolution, a conduit through which rights extend
from the international to the individual. In the aftermath of World War I, however,
citizenship had become increasingly based on “ethnicity, language and race”.13 This
shift, combined with territorial transfers throughout the world, left a large number of
stateless persons at the start of World War II.14 The events of the War, especially the
large number of Jews left stateless following the defeat of the Axis powers, expedited
the actions of international bodies in addressing the statelessness issue.15
The shortcomings of international human rights law, dependent upon the stable
and competent exercise of state obligation, were first addressed by the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter Refugee Convention). The
Refugee Convention recognized that the rights of persons outside their country of
origin needed to be delineated, particularly if these individuals did not possess citi-
zenship in any state. Although the Refugee Convention extended protection to
refugees, especially those who were stateless, it did not protect individuals who were
stateless yet not refugees.
The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (hereafter
Stateless Persons Convention) was specifically designed to protect stateless persons
not covered by the Refugee Convention as stated in the Preamble. Article 1 defines
a stateless person as one “who is not considered as a national by any State under the
operation of its law”. This type of statelessness is referred to as de jure statelessness.
Commonly, an individual is de jure stateless if he or she is ‘originally’ or ‘subse-
quently’ stateless, that is, if he or she did not obtain nationality at birth or lost a
nationality and was unable to acquire another. The 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness (hereafter Reduction Convention) strengthened the edi-
fice of the statelessness regime by employing the same definition as the Stateless
Persons Convention and reinforcing the special obligations of states to stateless indi-
viduals in the naturalization process. The Refugee Convention, Stateless Persons
Convention and Reduction Convention, when considered in concert, extend protec-
tion to those individuals who cannot claim citizenship in any state, regardless of
whether they are refugees. These treaties do not examine the “quality” of citizenship
or the ability of a citizen to possess “effective nationality”;16 statelessness resulting
from an inability either to enjoy the privileges of citizenship or to establish nation-
ality is generally neglected by international law. This type of statelessness is referred
to as de facto statelessness. A central problem of international law pertaining to
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13 A. M. Warnke, ‘Vagabonds, Tinkers, and Travelers: Statelessness among the East European Roma,’
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Problem of Resolving Nationality Status’, 10 International Journal of Refugee Law no. 157 (1998) p. 239.
14 Warnke, ‘Vagabonds, Tinkers, and Travelers: Statelessness among the East European Roma’,
pp. 353–4.
15 Ibid., p. 355.
16 Ibid., pp. 352, 355.
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statelessness is that newly-formed states have not ratified the relevant treaties.17
These states are therefore only bound to customary law concerning citizenship and
transfers of territory.18
Where U.N. treaties fell short in their protection, European law emerged to fill the
gap. In 1997, the European Convention on Nationality opened for signature; the
Convention stated that in the event of succession the state party should “take account
in particular” of the “genuine and effective link of the person”, his or her “habitual
residence”, his or her “will”, and the “territorial origin” of the individual.19
Moreover, the Declaration on the Consequences of State Succession for the
Nationality of Natural Persons was adopted in 1996 by the Venice Commission, a
body of the Council of Europe, and posits, “the successor State shall grant its nation-
ality to all nationals of the predecessor State residing permanently on the transferred
territory”.20
3. The 1993 Czech Citizenship Law and Amendments
This section will present the background to the passage of the 1993 Czech citizen-
ship law and the 1999 amendment. In order to understand the motivation for the
amendment and for compliance with international and regional law that the amend-
ment represented, it is necessary to look at a number of events between 1993 and
1999, including economic policy, NGO organization and international support. Most
importantly, this case study will present two major ideological trends that endured
throughout the period: the trend of euroskepticism personified by Klaus and the ODS
and the trend supporting European Society as advocated by Havel and later by the
CSSD party.
To understand the politics of Roma statelessness, it is necessary to begin with the
expulsion of the Germans from Sudetenland, in what is now the Czech Republic, fol-
lowing the end of World War II. Roma originating in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian
Ukraine emigrated to the region to fill the labour shortage left by the expelled
Germans.21 Since almost all Czech Roma were killed in concentration camps during
World War II, the overwhelming majority of Roma living in Czech territory in the
decades following the war originally came from elsewhere. Human Rights Watch has
estimated that “approximately 95 per cent of the Czech Republic’s Roma population
had moved to the Czech Republic from Slovakia after World War II”.22
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17 J. L. Blackman, ‘State Succession and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective Nationality
under International Law’, 19 Michigan Journal of International Law (1997–8) p. 1142.
18 See ibid. and Batchelor, ‘Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status’, for an elab-
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19 Council of Europe, ‘European Convention on Nationality’, (1997) Article 18(2).
20 Venice Commission, ‘Declaration on the Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality of
Natural Persons’, (Council of Europe, 1996) 8.a.
21 J. Siklova and M. Miklusakova, ‘Law as an Instrument of Discrimination: Denying Citizenship to
Czech Roma’, 7 East European Constitutional Review (1998) p. 2.
22 Human Rights Watch, supra note 6, p. 13.
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From 1918 to 1968, only one category of citizenship, federal citizenship, existed in
Czechoslovakia.23 This changed when the state, in an effort to appease Slovak nation-
alists following the 1968 Prague Spring, established a second type of citizenship:
Membership in the federation24 was supplemented by membership in one of the two
republics.25 Membership in a republic was based on the jus soli principle (citizenship
based on place of birth) for those born before 1 January 1954 and on the jus sanguinis
principle (citizenship based on parental citizenship) for those born after this date.26 The
use of jus soli, or citizenship as determined by place of birth, prior to 1954 meant that
Roma who came to the Czech Republic shortly after World War II were not granted
Czech citizenship but were instead understood to be Slovaks. The principle of jus san-
guinis, or citizenship based on the nationality of one’s parents, was applied to the
majority of the children of these Roma, those born after 1954. Roma who emigrated
to the Czech Republic after 1954 were assumed to have the citizenship of their parents,
and the children, grandchildren and great grandchildren of these Roma, most of whom
were born in the Czech Republic, were likewise assumed to have the citizenship of
their parents. As a result of these policies, the majority of Roma within Czech territory
were classified as Slovaks. Although there was an option period, during which one
could change one’s republican nationality, few availed themselves of this because there
was no practical advantage at the time for being either Slovak or Czech.27
3.1. The Citizenship Law
The practical equivalency between Czech and Slovak citizenship changed in 1993 with
the passage of the Czech citizenship law, Act No. 40/1993. The law effectively denied
these ‘Slovak’ Roma, many of whom had lived within the territory now called the
Czech Republic for generations, the right to vote, participate in the political sphere and
take part in many areas of economic transition.28 Although European norms and cus-
tomary law would dictate that domicile residence within the territory should be an
important consideration in the granting of citizenship, those with 1969 status as
Slovaks were forced to undergo a complicated application process to obtain Czech cit-
izenship. Article 18 of the citizenship law listed the requirements for seeking Czech
citizenship; these included permanent and continuous residence in the territory for five
years prior to the application date, proof of release from citizenship in Slovakia, and a
clean record void of “wilful punishable offences” for the preceding five years.29
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24 Law No. 165/1968
25 Law No. 39/1969
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for the division of Czech citizenship between the two standards, jus soli and jus sanguinis. The
Commission on the Security and Cooperation in Europe put the division at the 1968–9 law while Siklova
and Miklusakova date the division to 1954. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, ‘Ex Post
Facto Problems of the Czech Citizenship Law, Congress 104, Session No. 1’, (1996) p. 2.
27 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, supra note 26, p. 2.
28 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, ‘Czech Republic: Annual Report 1997’, (1997).
29 Government of the Czech Republic, ‘Act No. 40/1993 on Gaining and Losing Citizenship of the
Czech Republic Dated December 29th, 1992’, (1993) Article 7 (1.c.).
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The citizenship law was passed amid a massive economic transition supported
largely by Prime Minister Klaus. Klaus, along with President Havel, had previously
been members of an umbrella organization called the Civic Forum that helped to
bring down the communist regime in 1989 and defeated the communists in elections
in 1990. The Civic Forum had its intellectual roots in a political ideology that sought
unity among people and recognized the emergence of political parties as divisive.30
The organization was likewise grounded in human rights activism.31 Although the
Civic Forum disbanded in 1991, many strains of this ideology endured in the form
of a Havelian commitment to civil society. This political trend draws on Tocqueville
and emphasizes morality and humanism, seeks a unified society and the advance-
ment of the public good. 32 As such, civil society became the “cause celebre of inde-
pendent Czech intellectuals” and its cultivation was viewed as the panacea to
“society’s Communist-era atomisation”.33 Intellectuals committed to the idea of
Czech civil society also recognized the value of civil society at the regional level and
aspired to membership within a larger European entity. Havel, as the most visible
advocate of what can be referred to as the European society school of thought, found
promise in regional and international organizations that prevent violent clashes of
culture, including the EU, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the
United Nations, organizations whose common mission is to foster global fellowship
and collective enterprise among independent states.34
With the disbanding of the Civic Forum in 1991 and the emergence of the Czech
Republic’s first major political party, Klaus’ ODS, a challenge emerged to the “ide-
alist” civil society approach.35 Klaus advocated political development through a
party system and economic transformation based on radical privatisation and indi-
vidualism. Klaus’ reforms represented an abrupt departure from the concept of civil
society, a phenomenon he labelled “aberrant”.36 Klaus’ economic plan dismissed the
role of non-profit organizations in the emerging democracy and rejected any projects
that were reminiscent of “social engineering”.37 Where Havel and his followers
wanted to develop a Third Way, a middle path between the harsh competition of cap-
italism and the lack of freedom under communism, Klaus wanted an economy and
government that mirrored and rivalled the West.38
As Prime Minister from 1992 to 1997, Klaus initiated one of the most unregulated,
free market systems anywhere in the world. Capitalizing on the population’s residual fear
of communism, Klaus painted his opponents as socialists and dreamers, and presented
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30 A. Stroehlein, ‘Three Vaclavs’, 1 Central Europe Review (1999).
31 U.S. Department of State and Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, ‘Background Note: Czech
Republic’, (2003).
32 J. F. Pontuso, ‘Transformation Politics: The Debate between Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Klaus on the
Free Market and Civil Society’, 54 Studies in East European Thought (2002) p. 156.
33 Stroehlein, supra note 30.
34 Pontuso, supra note 32, p. 167.
35 Stroehlein, supra note 30.
36 Ibid.
37 Stroehlein, supra note 30.
38 Stroehlein, supra note 30.
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his own approach as a model of economic development; he did not lack for adher-
ents.39 Early in Klaus’ term, Europe hailed the Czech Republic as a “model transi-
tion country”.40 The “Czech Miracle” boasted low unemployment (3.5 per cent), low
inflation (8.8 per cent), robust economic growth (4.1 per cent) and a 0.1 per cent
budget deficit.41 Social programs, however, suffered under Klaus’ economic
approach as universal welfare policies gave way to means-tested policies.42
It was during this period of market-driven social welfare reform that the citizen-
ship law was drafted and approved. Predictions of Roma emigration from Slovakia
were perceived to be threatening because of the expected toll on the welfare system.
A confidential document written by the Czech government in 1992 outlined the
‘catastrophe scenario’, the threat posed by a massive influx of ‘Slovak’ Roma fol-
lowing Czechoslovakia’s dissolution.43 By most economic indicators, the Slovak
Republic, and by extension those emigrating from the Slovak Republic, were
markedly poorer. The Republic’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 1993, at USD
13.4 billion, was less than half that of the Czech Republic, at USD 34.4 billion.44
The type of statelessness that befell ‘Slovak’ Roma as a result of the citizenship law
can be classified as de jure.45 Roma born in the territory of the Czech Republic
enjoyed the protection of Czechoslovakia until its disintegration in 1989 and then
helped to elect, in 1992, the Parliament that denaturalised them in 1993.46 Most Roma
were unable to meet the requirements established in Article 18 of the citizenship law.
Many lacked the necessary documents to prove residency; others resided in substan-
dard housing due to poverty and were hence classified as ‘temporary legal residents’
and could not prove a five-year residency;47 still others were released from Slovak cit-
izenship and not offered Czech citizenship. The most blatant violation of international
law, especially with regard to standards of state succession, was the ex post facto penal
sanction of denaturalisation for crimes committed within five years of the 1993 law.
This last stipulation meant that even though the loss or denial of citizenship was not
a possible penalty at the time a crime was committed, the government imposed this
sanction ex post facto, thus dramatically increasing the penalties for past crimes. The
applications for citizenship by Roma with criminal records were thus denied.
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39 Ibid.
40 A. Stroehlein et al., ‘The Czech Republic 1992 to 1999: From Unintentional Political Birth to
Prolonged Political Crisis’, 1 Central Europe Review (1999).
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Siklova and Miklusakova, supra note 21, p. 4. The document reportedly referred to the “Romani
question” and stated that, “[w]e should use the process for the purpose of departure of not-needed per-
sons from factories, especially for the reasons of structural changes, and for the departure of people of
Roma nationality to the Slovak Republic” according to Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch,
supra note 6).
44 The World Bank Group, ‘Czech Republic at a Glance’, (2004) The World Bank Group, ‘Slovak
Republic at a Glance’, (2004).
45 Warnke, supra note 13, p. 352.
46 E. Schlager, ‘Czech Citizenship Law Lightning Rod for International Criticism’, 21 The
Commissioner for Security and Cooperation in Europe Digest (1998) p. 32.
47 Human Rights Watch, supra note 6.
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Moreover, NGOs active in the Czech Republic at the time reported that citizenship
was denied to some Roma who did not have criminal records but who had been
merely arrested and released without charges.48 Finally, since many Roma were not
able to understand the multiple provisions of the citizenship law and because many
government workers likewise did not understand the policies or deliberately misled
applicants, accurate and successful applications by Roma were further discouraged.
3.2. NGO Efforts
Between 1993 and 1999, NGOs, activists and other norm entrepreneurs were able to
draw international attention to the citizenship violations via a number of strategies.
Local organizations such as HOST  –  Citizens Solidarity & Tolerance Movement,
the Advisory Centre for Citizenship, students of the Prague Faculty of Social Science
and other activists and organizations partnered with larger Roma and human rights
NGOs to establish social services and provide legal assistance to those affected by
the law and to secure international support.49 These larger NGOs included Roma
Civic Initiative, Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, and the Tolerance Foundation (a local
Roma assistance program).50 In 1994, a forum was established to bring these groups
together in order to coordinate the dissemination of information, institutionalise co-
decision making, present a united front to the media and brainstorm methods of
gaining international support.51
The first step of their campaign was to recognize the technical problems of ‘re-
naturalization’, including the collection of documents, and to inform victims of their
rights and legal processes.52 Second, a large disjuncture developed between public
and NGO support, which the coalition of NGOs tried to rectify. The disjuncture
emerged when the government countered accusations of human rights violations
against Roma; the public, quick to minimize the problems “of some Roma”, did not
therefore mobilize on the side of the NGOs and instead accepted the government’s
explanation.53 Governmental use of media in debunking the claims of NGOs regard-
ing the new law was therefore effective in disabling a grassroots push for change.54
Hence, the task of developing an organizational base from which to pressure the gov-
ernment for change from below fell solely on the shoulders of local NGOs.55 Despite
this setback, the coalition would later experience a windfall when other NGOs not
focused solely on Roma issues joined their ranks.56 These other NGOs, which
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48 Ibid.
49 Michal Horak and HOST Czech Republic, ‘Brief Description of the Opposition of the Civic
Initiatives against the Czech Citizenship Law (1993–1996)’ paper presented at the European Roma Rights
Centre Conference on Personal Documents and Threats to the Exercise of Fundamental Rights among
Roma in the Former Yugoslavia, Igalo, Montenegro (September 2002).
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
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included the Czech Branch of the Radical Party, were instrumental in winning inter-
national attention because they were experienced in media relations and some mem-
bers of their boards or executives were well-known dissidents.57
3.3. International Institutions
Beginning in 1996, international institutions increased their criticism of the Czech
Republic. The Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe of the United
States Congress (CSCE), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) and Human Rights Watch joined the chorus of European criticism over
the citizenship law and other issues of social justice regarding Roma. These organi-
zations were drawn to the case by concerns over the rule of law and human rights
violations.58 A 1996 UNHCR report argued that “those who were permanently resi-
dent in the Czech Republic should not, in January 1993, have been classified as
Slovak citizens”, that those Roma had a “genuine effective link with Czech terri-
tory”, and that the “attribution of Slovak citizenship . . . does not conform with gen-
erally accepted rules of international law”.59
The CSCE was especially influential early on because it focused not on the vic-
tims of the citizenship law specifically but rather on the broader issue of discrimi-
nation proscribed by customary law.60 First, the CSCE did not argue that the Czech
Republic was in violation of its international obligations not to create stateless peo-
ple; the argument would have been difficult to substantiate since the Czech
Republic had not signed the Stateless Persons Convention and did not ratify the
Reduction Convention until 2001. Instead the CSCE stressed the discrimination
resulting from the differential treatment of different classes of citizens, the status of
orphans, the failure to provide citizens with a fair hearing and other types of dis-
crimination clearly within the bounds of international law already ratified by the
Czech Republic. Second, the CSCE argued that the Czech Republic had an interna-
tional obligation to refrain from increasing criminal penalties ex post facto. Citing
legal instruments outside of the Stateless Persons Convention and the Reduction
Convention, such as UDHR Article 11§2; the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) Articles 15§1, 4§2; the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) Articles 7§1,
15§2; and the Helsinki Final Act Principle X, the CSCE condemned what they
labelled unlawful penal sanctions.61
The campaign was further bolstered by the participation of the Council of Europe.
In a 1996 report, the Council of Europe62 found the ex post facto sanctions to be dis-
criminatory in cases of state succession where the individual affected had been a
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long-term resident of the state.63 The Council also took issue with the disenfran-
chisement of individual citizens and asserted that the criteria for citizenship should
rest in a “genuine and effective link with the state concerned”.64 The Council advised
the Czech government to review its obligations under Article 865 of the ECHR, which
addresses private, family and home life.66
During the six years between the passage of the 1993 law and the 1999 amend-
ment, a number of minor amendments were introduced. None, however, were able to
quash the increasing international criticism of the 1993 law. The EU’s early admira-
tion for the Czech Republic, steadfast throughout the early stages of transition due
to the country’s economic robustness, began to show signs of wear by 1996. The
‘miracle’ was seen as illusory, buttressed by corruption and overrated through arro-
gance. Believing that association with “lesser” countries would merely delay the
Czech Republic’s entry into the EU, Klaus rejected trade agreements with neigh-
bouring Višegrad67 countries, reneging upon previous commitments to cooperate
with these countries (a case in point is Klaus’ foot-dragging with the European
Community (EC)- “inspired” Central European Free Trade Area agreement, hereafter
CEFTA).68 Some have suggested that Klaus was banking on Germany’s help to enter
the EU, but German Chancellor Helmut Kohl disliked Klaus both for his failure to
compensate Sudeten Germans and for his critique of Kohl’s “pet projects” such as
the single currency.69 Klaus’ arrogance regarding the Czech Republic’s “exception-
alism” cost him a number of friends in Europe.70 It was these soured relationships,
along with Klaus’ increasing critique of the European project that earned him a rep-
utation of euroskepticism, one that the ODS still carries today.
By 1997, pressure from the EU and Council of Europe to amend the law as a pre-
requisite of accession was in full force. The Venice Convention of the Council of
Europe adopted the Declaration on the Consequences of State Succession for the
Nationality of Natural Persons in 1996. This Declaration, along the European
Convention on Nationality, which was finalized in 1996 and opened for signature in
1997, presented clear guidelines for the conferral of citizenship in periods of state
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succession. States, these documents declared, are to consider domicile as well as
other factors in determining nationality.71
Previous amendments to the citizenship law, dating from 1996, were “largely
designed to placate international critics abroad” even though they did not bring
Czech law into compliance with international norms.72 Not a single Czech political
party proposed amending the more discriminatory parts of the law before 1996 and
the issuance of the Council of Europe recommendations. In fact, the government
ignored the criticism at first, hiding behind the mantle of state sovereignty in an
effort to thwart international pressure. The impetus to amend the law substantially
came only with the Czech Republic’s application for EU membership in 1996, after
the release of the Council of Europe recommendations in April 1996 and after the
realization by the EU in 1997 that Klaus’ miracle economy proved to be well short
of miraculous.73
EU disapproval of Czech policy was conveyed to the Czech Republic primarily
through accession documents, especially the Agenda 2000 (published in 1997) and
the ‘Regular Reports’ that were published every year thereafter to assess the progress
of the accession states toward membership. As such, “membership conditionality”,
the EU’s carrots and sticks, incentive-based approach to inducing desired policy
changes on the part of prospective member states, was used to pressure the Czech
Republic to amend the citizenship law.74
This pressure was also manifested through funding from the EU for accession.
The Phare program, established in 1989 to support the economic and political tran-
sition of Eastern European countries, originally focused on “sectors that contributed
directly to the transition to a market economy”.75 However, beginning in 1994, the
program began to include support for projects with a civil society mission.76 In the
years leading up to 1998, an average of EUR 100,000 was granted each year to
accession countries to support projects dedicated to improving the social, economic
and legal status of Roma.77 For the Czech Republic, funds were increased to EUR 0.9
million in 1998 and given directly to local NGOs.78 Between 1993 and 1999, Phare-
funded programs focusing on Roma totalled EUR 2,277,600.79 Phare-funding was
guided by the 1997 ‘Agenda 2000’ and subsequent Regular Reports, which were crit-
ical of the citizenship law.80 As the Czech case demonstrates, the ability of the EU to
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persuade states to change their behaviour stems from its “political capacity”, “finan-
cial resources”, and the citizen initiatives it can foster.81 All told, financial leverage
over the Czech Republic was considerable; from 1990 to 1997, the European
Community set aside ECU 493 million for “information and research programmes,
training, protection of the environment, social affairs, health, human rights and the
protection of ethnic minorities, particularly Roma gypsies”.82
3.4. State Pressure
The Czech Republic also increasingly found itself on the receiving end of interna-
tional criticism from individual nations. The scrutiny increased, and the correspon-
ding pressure intensified, in late 1997 when reportedly ‘large’ numbers of Roma
sought asylum in Canada, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and other European countries.
Canada’s reaction was to criticize the Czech Republic and implement visa restric-
tions. To make matters worse, a series of high-profile attacks and murders of Roma
and other minorities by skinheads embarrassed the country internationally and
exposed a government seemingly tolerant of such violence. Between 1989 and 1997,
at least 15 (and maybe as many as 29) Roma were murdered and hundreds suffered
violent attacks.83 Fears began to surface that the U.K. would follow Canada’s lead
and implement visa restrictions for Czechs. U.K. visa restrictions were even more
threatening to accession because of the negative effect they might have on the Czech
Republic’s application for EU membership.84 Moreover, immigration advocates in
the U.K. began to argue that the violence targeting Roma might classify them as
‘refugees’ and thus deserving of protection under international law.85 By 1998, Roma
began to win cases for asylum in both the U.K. and Canada.86
The public protests and demonstrations that followed this wave of violence offered
ample opportunity for Czech politicians to commit to ending racial and ethnic divi-
sion in the Republic, but they only assumed a defensive position. The government
first responded by denying accusations that the citizenship law was discriminatory.
An official of the Press Office of the Ministry of the Interior, Milan Kriz, argued,
“[n]o such discrimination takes place in our republic” when asked about the law and
its impact on Roma.87 The Czech ambassador to the United States (U.S.), Alexandr
Vondra, described the Human Rights report and Helsinki Commission report critical
of the law as “lies” and denied that Roma had been made stateless.88 In 1997, the
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Helsinki Commission published a letter to Klaus sent by U.S. Senator Alfonse
D’Amato and U.S. Representative Christopher H. Smith requesting that the law be
changed. Klaus replied directly, calling the letter “over-simplifying and inaccu-
rate”.89 The government responded to the UNHCR report by denying the law caused
any statelessness and by issuing a document, the National Programme, which cate-
gorically denied the law’s discriminatory impact on Roma.90 Even President Havel
declared the law to be sound.91
In August 1997, Minister without a Portfolio Pavel Bratinka, head of the Council
for Nationalities, released the Report on the Situation of the Roma Community in
the Czech Republic. The government initially rejected the report, stating that its rec-
ommendations were not concrete enough.92 That same month, two rapporteurs from
the Council of Europe visited the Czech Republic.93 The rapporteurs met with gov-
ernment officials, including Bratinka and representatives of the UNHCR, as well as
with local NGOs working to amend the law.94 Their subsequent report was highly
critical of Czech policy toward Roma.95
In October 1997, with the threatened visa restrictions from the U.K. looming, the
Czech government did an about-face and accepted the report.96 When asked about
the change, Bratinka’s Deputy Minister Viktor Dobal claimed that the “ministers
who had the greatest reservations about the material suddenly withdrew from their
earlier comments”.97 Klaus announced at a cabinet meeting that:
“the government is alarmed with the applications by some of our fellow citizens for
asylum in foreign countries and is firmly determined to confront the causes which led
to it. The government will do everything in its power so that no one is afraid because
of their membership in this or that minority community.”98
3.5 The Rise of the CSSD
Between 1997 and 1998, a series of developments produced a political shake-up,
resulting in a changing of the guard in the country’s leadership. In November 1997,
allegations of corruption in the ODS came to light, destabilizing financial markets
and causing the government coalition to dissolve. Calls for Klaus to resign
resounded both within and outside of his party, including a call for resignation from
Havel himself. Klaus resigned that very month with the entire government following
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suit.99 The combination of Klaus’ political fall and a recession-triggering financial
crisis (characterized by a string of bank failures, revelations about the lack of com-
petitiveness of Czech companies due to a paucity of reform, and the devaluing of the
Republic’s currency) brought to power the CSSD.
A force in Czech politics since the mid-1990s, the CSSD offered an alternative to
the harsh market reforms and rapid privatisation of the Klaus regime. The party mod-
elled itself after other European social democratic parties, identified with European
civil society, and befriended Havel. Yet the CSSD’s rise to power also coincided with
a rise in euroskepticism, fuelled by trade disputes between the Czech Republic and
the EU, later dubbed the ‘Apple War’ and ‘Pork War’.100 The Czech Republic had
placed import quotas on EU apples, leading to the elimination by the EU of trade
policies favouring the import of Czech products, including pork, poultry and juice.101
The resulting disparities in economic loss (where the EU lost 5.4 million ECU, the
Czech Republic lost 23.5 million ECU) greatly increased anti-EU sentiment, which
contributed in turn to the rise of nationalism.102 EU criticism of the citizenship law
continued unabated, however, and in January 1998, the British Immigration Minister,
Mike O’Brien, singled out the Czech policy regarding Roma during a visit to the
Republic. The public critique “stung” the government, which only then indicated a
willingness to address the situation.103
When elections took place in June 1998, the optimism of the early 1990s had
turned cynical; few even expected that EU accession would lift the national mood.104
Although the CSSD had won 74 of 200 seats, up from 61 in the 1994 elections, its
modest gain meant that it could not rule alone.105 An ‘opposition agreement’ between
the CSSD and the ODS was reached, securing for the CSSD a minority government,
while the chairmanship of both houses was given to the ODS.106 Milos Zemen of the
CSSD became Prime Minister and created a new government position for the pro-
tection of human rights. Petr Uhl, a Charter 77 signatory, received the appointment.
Charter 77, an association of dissidents in Czechoslovakia that organized to draw
attention to violations by the Soviet regime during the late 1970s and 1980s, was
founded on Western notions of human rights, particularly those laid out in the UDHR
and the Helsinki Final Act.107 Uhl was thus not only familiar with international stan-
dards of human rights; he understood the persuasive power of international pressure
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and the means of leveraging it. Zemen also began tackling older EU projects such as
Višegrad cooperation in CEFTA and regional restructuring.
The effect of the economic unravelling on the position of European institutions
toward the Czech Republic was readily apparent. In the Agenda 2000, the
Commission’s opinion on Czech membership in the EU, the Commission assumed a
critical stance, stating that the ex post facto penal sanction “was inconsistent with the
rule that state succession cannot result in people who have lived continuously in the
territory becoming aliens or stateless persons”.108 The Agenda went on to conclude,
however, that the 1996 amendment served to mitigate the effects of the unlawful
sanctions.109 More pointed criticism from the European Commission would not be
voiced until after the Czech economy began to decline precipitously. The Council of
Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and the
Economic and Social Committee of the European Union released reports that were
highly critical of the citizenship law in March and September 1998, respectively.110
In November 1998, the European Commission ratcheted up its critique as well, issu-
ing a pointedly negative report on the readiness of the Czech Republic for EU mem-
bership.111 The citizenship law ranked high on its list of issues. This document, the
first yearly progress report on the Czech Republic, took aim not only at the law but
its intended remedy in announcing that the 1996 amendment which was drafted to
redress the problem of unlawful penal sanctions “has not had much effect”.112 The
report stated, “[b]ureaucratic obstacles, administrative fees and the lack of a con-
certed approach by the relevant Ministries have delayed a successful resolution to the
problem”.113 The Commission then expressed hope that the CSSD government would
“offer an effective solution” by passing a more substantive amendment “so that all
former Czechoslovak citizens residing in the Czech Republic at the time of the dis-
solution of the Czechoslovak federation and who are still living there now may
acquire Czech citizenship”.114
The shift in opinion of the Czech Republic by European institutions was mirrored
within the Republic as well, as opinion polls revealed steadily decreasing levels of
support for accession as a result of the trade disputes and the country’s recession. By
January 1999, Czech polls showed support for EU membership at an all-time low of
57 per cent, down from 85 per cent in 1993 and 72 per cent in 1998.115 The European
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Parliament indicated the drop might be in response to the import disputes of the
apple and pork ‘wars’.116
Although all parties voiced some reservations regarding EU entry in order to tap
into the growing anti-EU sentiment and an increasingly nationalistic political cli-
mate, the CSSD and Havel acted to strengthen ties with Europe despite the furor over
the trade disputes.117 The CSSD had been careful to cultivate a commitment to
European society, despite fears that increased competition could harm labour and
other areas of society that served as the party’s political base. The CSSD identified
with the European project and supported accession primarily because it was com-
mitted to social programs developed by other social democratic and labour parties in
Europe and to the ideas embodied in the European Social Charter.118 Havel, in typi-
cal European society fashion, had expressed a desire for “European civic belong-
ing”, recognizing the advantages of membership within a “super-state community”,
including “indivisible” security and a common constitution.119 Moreover, Havel had
routinely criticized the ODS for its domestic and international policies, including a
timely call in 1997 denouncing “Czech provincialism, selfishness, and isolationism
in politics”.120
After a change in leadership, and despite the opposition of the ODS, the Czech
Senate approved an amendment to the citizenship law in July 1999.121 The amend-
ment declared that those individuals who resided on Czech territory on 31 December
1992 were eligible for Czech citizenship. Havel signed the amendment in August
1999, making the Czech Republic compliant with norms regarding statelessness. In
2004, the Czech Republic joined nine other states in gaining EU membership.
4. Findings
Interest-based approaches would predict that the eventual compliance of the Czech
Republic with international norms and law did not reflect a change in preferences
over outcomes, only a change in preferences over policies. Thus, these theories
would dictate that the Czech Republic’s preference of economic gain remained con-
stant; only a change in strategy occurred. The expected influx of large numbers of
Roma was predicted to cause economic loss, leading to the passage of the 1993 cit-
izenship law; conversely, economic gain was predicted with admission to the EU,
and the subsequent amendments to the law were efforts to secure membership.
Interest-based approaches would suggest that the change in compliance in 1999 was
358 ROBYN LINDE
116 Ibid.
117 A. Stroehlein, ‘Let Sleeping Euro-Dogs Lie’, 0:25 Central Europe Review (1999).
118 L.A. Rovna, ‘The Enlargement of the European Union: The Case of the Czech Republic’, 2:1
Perspectives on European Politics and Society (2001) p. 16.
119 European Parliament, supra note 104, p. 17.
120 M. Potucek, ‘Havel Versus Klaus: Public Policy Making in the Czech Republic’, Journal of
Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice (1999) p. 166.
121 European Roma Rights Centre, ‘Czech Republic Amends Anti-Romani Law’, 3 Roma Rights
Quarterly (1999).
IJGR-13-4-02-RobynLinde  11/16/06  2:44 PM  Page 358
entirely based upon the perceived economic advantages of EU membership, and
could be explained without reference to ideas such as euroskepticism and European
society. Furthermore, because interests are developed exogenously prior to interac-
tion, these approaches assume that it is not necessary to explore changes in domes-
tic leadership as an explanation for the state’s shift in compliance.
Such an explanation might go as follows: the Czech Republic has long had a mate-
rial interest in gaining access to European markets. Therefore, when international
organizations, especially European organizations, began to pressure the state to con-
form to human rights standards, it complied in an effort to gain access to European
markets and admission into European institutions, notably the EU and Council of
Europe. Especially applicable here is Beth Simmons’ argument regarding the
International Monetary Fund. According to Simmons, interest-based approaches
suggest that reputation plays a role in state compliance with international law.122 In
particular, Simmons found that reputational concerns are most acute within regions.
According to Simmons, states make commitments to win credibility within a partic-
ular issue-area. They commit when it is in their interest to do so, and they comply in
order to enhance their reputation. Simmons argues that states that expect economic
gains in the long run will comply even in the face of substantial short-term losses.
Regional commitments play a role in part because countries that lag behind their
neighbours, especially when their markets are practically interchangeable, face com-
petitive disadvantage.123
The Czech Republic did see neighbouring countries as competitors, especially
those, like the Višegrad states, with similar economies. Under the Klaus regime, the
ODS did not cooperate fully with the EC’s CEFTA agreement because cooperation
with these countries was perceived to negatively effect its prospects for EU admis-
sion. An interest-based theorist would suggest that since the Czech Republic saw
itself competing with neighbouring countries for EU membership, it acquiesced to
EU demands, including the 1999 amendment, in order to remain competitive for
accession.
This account raises two questions: first, since the Czech Republic expressed inter-
est in joining the EU shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, why for six years did
it flout international standards regarding citizenship conferral following the transfer
of territory? If the promises of economic gain in EU accession were the sole moti-
vator behind the passage of the 1999 amendment, why did these promises exercise
so little impact prior to 1999? One possible explanation is that the human rights vio-
lations of the original citizenship law were poorly understood until they were clari-
fied by domestic NGOs. Similarly, another explanation is that Klaus and the ODS
did not grasp the extent of the EU and the Council of Europe’s concern with the law.
If this were the case, it follows that substantive amendments would have been made
at an earlier stage, soon after the Council of Europe expressed disapproval in 1996
and the EU issued its own condemnation of the law.
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Moreover, the first task of domestic NGOs was to delineate the exact nature and
effect of the law on Roma, which they did shortly after the law’s passage. If the law’s
supporters claimed ignorance over its impact on Roma and Europe’s consequent
reaction, they could not easily do so after 1996. More importantly, Klaus and many
members of the ODS were steadfast in their support of the law and their opposition
to any substantive amendments even as late as 1999. It is therefore difficult to main-
tain that uncertainty over the law’s human rights violations or Europe’s reaction was
cause for the ODS’ ongoing support given that this support did not wane even after
the amendment became a priority for accession.
Second, why did the Czech Republic pass the amendment when Eurobarometers
showed the lowest support for accession since 1989 and when trade disputes had
increased anti-EU sentiment to such a degree that it became politically advantageous
for parties to express reservation? Why did the Czech Republic comply with EU
demands in the face of a deep recession and the increasingly inequitable costs of com-
pliance? These questions can only be answered by examining the basis of support for
the original citizenship law and the 1999 amendment. As presented in the case study
above, Klaus’ ODS party was responsible for the economic restructuring that led to the
1993 citizenship law.124 Furthermore, although minor amendments were introduced
during Klaus’ tenure as Prime Minister, a substantive amendment was not passed until
after Klaus had resigned and the CSSD took power. A euroskeptic ODS passed the cit-
izenship law and voted against the 1999 amendment. The ODS did not reverse course
and comply with European human rights norms because it was privy to more infor-
mation and thus recognized the long-term economic potential of EU membership;
rather, the ODS continued to vote just as it had in 1993. The CSSD, on the other hand,
passed the amendment when the country’s economic interests suggested a different
policy approach. This is consistent with the CSSD position that EU accession would
not merely be an economic integration but a political and social one as well.
The case provides evidence of both the usefulness and the incompleteness of
interest-based approaches in important ways. While it may be true that economic
interests were the principal motivator behind the ODS’ support for the 1993 law and
its opposition to the 1999 amendment, the amendment’s ultimate passage speaks to
the presence of competing motivators. A more complete explanation for the Czech
Republic’s compliance with European human rights norms lies in the Havelian
vision of the Czech Republic as a European state and its identity with the European
community. The CSSD secured the amendment’s passage despite an economic rela-
tionship marked by large-scale inequality, massive short-term losses, and widespread
public disdain. Interest-based theories are unable to explain fully the amendment’s
passage unless they are broadened to include the role of identity and the values and
ideas of individuals in domestic politics, particularly ideas in support of European
society. As such, they do not explain how interests are developed, and are not fully
capable of explaining policy change.
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A knowledge-based approach to the 1999 amendment might go as follows: The
Czech Republic was a country undergoing fundamental change in the first part of the
1990s. During this time there were competing ideological schools of thought: one,
represented by Klaus and the ODS, was a school of euroskepticism whose inconstant
vision of the Czech Republic vacillated between a market economy modelled upon
the West to the more reactionary nationalism that followed the trade disputes. This
was the party that flouted EU policy both in passing the citizenship law and in oppos-
ing the 1999 amendment. A second school of thought, embodied by Havel and later
by the CSSD, was a European society school that sought membership in a European
civil society that shared its values and ideology. The CSSD’s rise to power was the
decisive factor in the amendment’s passage.
Knowledge-based theories would suggest that in order to understand the Czech
Republic’s compliance in 1999 with international standards of citizenship conferral
in periods of territory transfer it is necessary to look at the ideas of domestic agents
along with their vulnerability to international pressure.125 There was virtually no sub-
stantive government attention to amending the citizenship law until after the Council
of Europe, UNHCR and CSCE recommendations in 1996. One study conducted by
Peter Vermeersch found that policy documents pertaining to Roma were “direct
responses to monitoring by the Commission and by other monitoring agencies on
which the EU has relied”.126
Certain knowledge-based theories, however, suggest that rationality is important
in understanding state behaviour. These approaches hold that interest-based theories
play an important explanatory role but one that is incomplete. The pro-European
CSSD embraced the idea of an inclusive European society and sought membership
within it. The effort by the CSSD to mute international criticism and comply with
international norms can partially be explained by an economic interest in member-
ship in the communities that were most vociferously critical of the Czech Republic.
Interest-based theories, however, expect states to behave in ways that maximize their
long-term economic benefits. Therefore, states should overlook short-term losses but
only when it is clear that these losses are indeed short-term. When the economic
forecast is cloudy or when new priorities emerge, interest-based theories cannot
explain why states stay the course in the face of possible long-term economic losses.
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such as developing a “common frame of meaning” in order to shape the terms of the debate and persuade
other actors of their position. See M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, 1998) p. 8 for more information about liberal constructivism and the activities
of NGOs attempting to change state policy.
126 Vermeersch, supra note 73, p. 22.
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In other words, if it was clear to policymakers in the Czech Republic (both in the
ODS and the CSSD) that short-term economic losses were a necessary hurdle to the
long-term economic gain that EU membership promised, then interest-based theo-
ries sufficiently explain the adoption of the amendment by the CSSD (but not its
rejection by the ODS). If, as the case demonstrates, vocal members of the public
were increasingly pessimistic about the advantages to be secured through EU mem-
bership, then interest-based theories need an added dimension to fully explain why
some policymakers continued to actively pursue membership and embrace policies
that ran counter to the country’s economic interests. Regardless of which interpreta-
tion one finds more credible, there is a puzzle: If the former interpretation is
accepted, then the ODS should have supported the 1999 amendment that would
result in short-term economic losses but long-term economic gain; they did not. If
the latter interpretation is accepted, as this paper argues, what motivated the CSSD
to pursue a pro-European policy in the face of uncertain gains? Interest-based theo-
ries cannot explain the adoption of the amendment without reference to the ideas and
values of domestic agents, namely the pro-European Society school of thought rep-
resented by the CSSD.
Risse and Sikkink’s model is useful because it lays out a clear pattern of state
behaviour regarding human rights change, a spiral pattern according to which states
reject, deny, accept and change their policies to comply with international and
regional pressure.127 This model draws on a type of knowledge-based approach,
labelled ‘strategic social constructivism’, which recognizes the utility of interest-
based approaches but sees these approaches, in certain cases, as insufficient or
incomplete. In Table 1, the Czech case is plotted in order to present actual changes
in compliance in relation to the expectations of the model.
Beginning with phase 1, the citizenship law rendered approximately 10,000 to
25,000 individuals stateless in 1993 and led to the mobilization of local NGOs
around the issue. Met with resistance and the denial of human rights violations by
the government, NGOs sought and received international support. The government
reacted to the increased attention, both internationally and domestically, by denying
the validity of the accusations and citing its sovereignty as a means of dispelling the
criticism (phase 2). The government made tactical concessions in the form of a vari-
ety of minor amendments between 1996 and 1999 (phase 3); however, it was not
until a change in domestic leadership that the more discriminatory parts of the law
were amended (phase 4). One could argue that phase 5, rule-consistent behaviour,
was accomplished by the Czech Republic’s entry into the EU in 2004.
Interest-based theories are most useful prior to phase 1 and during phase 3 of
Risse and Sikkink’s spiral model (see Figure 1). Klaus supported the law in 1993
because the ODS-led government was concerned about the immigration of Slovak
Roma, a potential obstacle to economic reform. The tactical concessions of phase 3
coincided with the demise of Klaus’ miracle economy. It was only when Klaus could
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no longer stand on his economic record that he turned his attention to other EU
demands. Sociological approaches begin to work in phase 3. What began as instru-
mental changes in rhetoric increasingly became “a true dialogue over specific human
rights allegations” leading to the compliance of phase 4.128
COMPETING THEORIES OF STATE COMPLIANCE 363
128 Ibid., p. 28.
Table 1. Spiral Model of Human Rights Change as Applied to the 1993
Citizenship Law in the Czech Republic.
Expectations 
of Risse and 
Sikkink’s 
Model The Model as Applied to the Citizenship  
Law in the Czech Republic
Phase 1: 1993 The citizenship law is introduced in 1993. A small
Repression number of NGOs challenge the ODS-led government
on the law. The government does not change the law. 
Phase 2: 1994-1997 The ODS government denies accusations of human
Denial rights violations. In its denial, it cites national sov-
ereignty and, among other tactics, launches a media
campaign to combat the charges by domestic and
international organizations.
Phase 3: 1996–1999 The ODS government makes some concessions 
Tactical allowing for amendments to the citizenship law but
Concession the most discriminatory parts of the law remain
intact. The criticism of the Czech government by
NGOs increases. Important international actors such
as the CSCE, UNHCR and the Council of Europe
apply pressure to the government. Negotiations for
accession are formally launched with the European
Union in December of 1997.
Phase 4: 1999 Klaus and the ODS resign in 1997. The CSSD 
Prescriptive comes to power and passes the 1999 amendment.
Status
Phase 5: 2004 The EU invites the Czech Republic to join in
Rule-consistent December 2002. The Czech Republic joins the EU
Behaviour. in 2004. Rule-consistent behaviour is expected by
accession into a community like the EU that
requires transparency and possesses enforcement
mechanisms.
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The CSSD was more vulnerable to criticism over the citizenship law, which
explains the relatively quick move toward compliance between the elections in June
1998 and the passage of the amendment in July 1999. A change in leadership in 1998
thus led to compliance because the CSSD possessed different ideas about global
civil society than did the ODS. The European-minded CSSD was vulnerable to
domestic and international (especially European) pressure because it sought mem-
bership in a community on the basis of shared values. This type of vulnerability to
pressure occurs when particular elements of the international community exercise
leverage over the violating state. The degree to which a state wishes to join a partic-
ular community is determinative in its decision to comply with the norms and rules
of that community. Amy Gurowitz, in a study of Korean and migrant worker rights
in Japan, found that changes in discriminatory policies in Japan have been a result
of domestic actors employing international norms as leverage against a resistant
state.129 Gurowitz found that this leverage, however, is dependent upon the state’s
vulnerability to international criticism, especially in areas which the state perceives
as important to its identity or to the way in which it functions in the international sys-
tem.130 The CSSD, unlike the ODS, was vulnerable to international pressure because
the idea of a greater Europe was foundational to its ideology and political platform;
the CSSD and the ‘civil society intellectuals’ were willing to ride out the unfair tar-
iffs, crushing economic reforms and often unrealistic social and economic require-
ments because they already perceived themselves as members of the larger European
community.
5. Conclusion
As the discussion demonstrates, interest-based arguments are useful but insufficient
to explain the Czech Republic’s compliance with European human rights norms in
amending its 1993 citizenship law. The Czech Republic’s compliance with these
norms must be primarily attributed not only to economics, but also to identity, to the
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Figure 1. Knowledge- and Interest-based Theories as Applied to Phases of the
Spiral Model
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Havelian identification of the Czech Republic as a European state, and by extension,
to an acceptance of European standards as Czech standards. A central tenet of inter-
est-based theories is that interests are exogenous and hence, unchanging. Thus, when
a change in interests is evident, as in this case study, interest-based theories cannot
fully account for that change. Instead, a complementary approach is called for,
whereby interest-based theories are made complete by sociological theories, which
emphasize the role of ideational agents in producing change and securing compli-
ance with human rights norms.
Unlike interest-based theories that assume a universal rationality across time and
space, knowledge-based theories recognize the role of the post-Soviet world envi-
ronment and the influence of this environment on the ability of actors to comply or
in the compulsion to conform.
As Risse and Sikkink make clear, it is not economic advantage alone that allows
a state to resist or comply; the most vulnerable states are often the ones with the
greatest concern for reputation, specifically a reputation that conforms to their self-
identity.131 The CSSD would not have been as vulnerable to regional and interna-
tional pressure had it been faced with this policy decision in a different period of
time. The emerging market economy, the transition from Soviet rule, and the lure of
European society are all historically contingent. In order to understand fully the re-
naturalization of Roma in the Czech Republic, it is necessary to examine both the
interests of actors and the identities through which interests emerge.
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